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Clearly, therefore, a basis had been laid for the development of a significant Polish community in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK.
The factors which decisively influenced that development were multifarious. Regretfully, many were also inauspicious. In particular, two fundamental attitudes were very much in evidence during these early post-war years. First, the vast majority of Poles did not want to be in Scotland or anywhere else in the UK, and regarded their sojourn, therefore, as merely temporary. They wanted to be in the free and independent Poland for which they had fought from the beginning to the end of the war. Second, neither the British government, particularly the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, nor the British public at large wanted the Poles to remain in the UK. At the end of the war, the universal expectation was that the Polish troops would be repatriated en masse.
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These negative attitudes on both sides were exacerbated by a series of developments, some of which had been in the making during the course of the war.
In the first instance, the Poles in the UK felt betrayed by the political outcome of the war. Feelings of acute bitterness, anger, resentment, contempt and disillusionment were directed at their ertswhile British and American allies. Their considerable military contribution to the Allied war effort, beginning with the role of Polish airmen in the Battle of Britain, and subsequently encompassing, for example, the exploits in Normandy and the Low Countries of the First Polish Armoured Division under General Stanis)aw Maczek, and of the Second Polish Corps in Italy under General W)adys)aw Anders, had apparently counted for nothing in the end. 3 The cause of a Free Poland, as represented by the Polish Government in London, led until his death in July 1943 by General W)adys)aw Sikorski, 4 had been systematically compromised and then finally abandoned by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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From the moment the Soviet Union joined Britain and the USA in the Grand Alliance, in 1941, the Western leaders had been prepared to sacrifice Polish interests in order to keep Stalin on side. The Soviets were considered to be crucial to victory over Hitler, while the Poles were not, and the fact that Stalin had been an ally of Nazi Germany for two years previously was forgotten as a matter of political and military expediency.
Consequently, the Polish national interest, as understood by Sikorski's government and its many supporters in Poland, was progressively marginalized until it was ultimately ignored altogether. Upon its discovery in April 1943, the Katyn Massacre had been played down by Churchill, and this type of behaviour that was inimical to the Polish cause continued most obviously at the Tehran Conference in December the same year, with particular
